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C A N N O N S C H M I T T
Introduction: Materia Media
THE ESSAYS IN THIS special issue of Criticism undertake various projects, not
all of which are similar or even compatible. But a common thread runs
throughout: whether elaborating on contemporary media practices or post-
modern emotions, early modern horses, fin de siècle human anomalies, or
Henry James, these essays broach the possibility of a new materialism. Such a
materialism proposes that neither media nor mediation should be thought as
insubstantial or passive relays between some “real” and our sensorium.
Rather, both media and mediation incarnate their own materiality, and both
must be analyzed with an eye to their specific and as yet insufficiently charac-
terized effectivity or reality.1 The coinage “materia media” aims to express in
small compass some of the manifold complexities and consequences of that
analysis. Modeled on the materia medica, “the remedial substances and prepa-
rations used in the practice of medicine” (OED), materia media names some-
thing we might call “medial substances” or “the substances used in media
practice.” The two kinds of substances are in some sense the same: mass com-
munication as well as means, instruments, materials, and techniques more
broadly are medial in that they mediate or stand between (between, for
instance, humans and other animals, writers and readers, war and its specta-
tors). The internet, cable news networks, film, equine portraiture, medical
and forensic photography, narrative fiction, the tape recorder—for the con-
tributors to this special issue, these and other media are mediations that do not
reflect or translate materiality so much as constitute it in their own right. Put
starkly, and to adapt a slogan from Marshall McLuhan, these essays demon-
strate that the media are the material.2
In the first essay, “Premediation,” Richard Grusin revisits the argument he
and Jay Bolter put forward in Remediation (1999), adding to their earlier claims
about the mediation of the past by positing the mediation of the future as well.
Remediation proper refers to a dialectic between past and present in which new
media forms incorporate the old, and older media forms respond by incorpo-
rating the new: some video games, for instance, derive their overriding logic
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from film noir or cinematic science fiction; a film like Run, Lola, Run works like
a video game. Premediation, on the other hand, may be understood as prolep-
tic, anticipatory mediation. Quite different from what might initially appear to
be synonyms (prediction, prophecy, premeditation), premediation does not
predict a future event so much as saturate futurity by rehearsing, ahead of time,
multiple possibilities. The Weather Channel deals in prediction: “Heavy snow
in the Midwest tomorrow.” The news media covering the so-called War on Ter-
ror premediate: a dirty bomb may be exploded in a population center; planes
may be hijacked again; the internet may be disrupted; biological weapons may
contaminate the food supply; etc., etc., etc. If or when any one of these events
comes to pass, it will have been premediated but not exactly predicted. And this
has implications for the now, the quotidian: while prediction with its accuracy
or failure of accuracy has specific future results (in the case of heavy snow, say,
school closings), premediation smuggles the future into the present by forcing
the present to reshape itself around a proliferation of possible futures. Under a
regime of premediation, the present is a paradoxical time, a “now” deformed by
a future against which it seeks to immunize itself.3
At one moment in his essay, Grusin brings to bear Bruno Latour’s refusal
of the subject-object dichotomy4 in the process of declaring the materiality of
the medial: “Just as one of the three corollaries of remediation insists on the
inseparability of reality and mediation, the reality of media, their materiality
as objects of circulation within the world of humans and non-humans, of soci-
ety and of things, so the concept of premediation insists on the reality of the
premediated future” (28). Donna Landry, as if in response to an odd oversight
of such Latourian thought, makes room in the “world . . . of society and things”
for animals, and specifically for a horse: the Bloody Shouldered Arabian of her
title. She sets out by placing animal studies in illuminating relation to the his-
tory of English nationality: “If examined with an eye towards the newer, ‘dis-
tributed’ stories of domestication and human-animal relations, . . . the verbal
and visual record reveals how crucial horses were to what emerged as distinc-
tively ‘English’ culture in early modern England” (41).5 That initial focus
expands as Landry works through, as it were, each node of Latour’s compound
“object-discourse-nature-society.”6 Documenting the emergence of the genre
of the horse portrait as well as a “new language of free forward movement and
equine initiative [that] entered the discourse of horsemanship” and of En-
glishness, she understands such novelties—and Swift’s Houyhnhnms, too—
as evidence of the complex legacy of the Bloody Shouldered Arabian and other
Eastern blood horses (42). “The influence of the Bloody Shouldered Arabian
and his kind on perception, representation, and social practice,” Landry con-
cludes, “should not . . . be underestimated. This kind of highly mediated
exchange between horses and humans—might we dare to call it a trace of
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equine agency?—should surely figure in any history of animals in which their
effects upon human society and culture are registered” (63).7
In “Queer Physiognomies,” Dana Seitler scrutinizes not equine portraiture
but another visual genre: the scientific illustration or photograph. John Berger,
characterizing the widespread influence of photography in particular, notes
that “[w]ithin a mere 30 years of its invention [in 1839] . . . , photography was
being used for police filing, war reporting, military reconnaissance, pornogra-
phy, encyclopedic documentation, family albums, postcards, anthropological
records. . . .”8 It is no accident that most of the uses to which Berger finds pho-
tography being put coincide with institutional knowledge-projects. As Seitler
outlines, the photograph took its place among a host of technologies of visibil-
ity crucial to the nascent human sciences. Michel Foucault, among others, has
attended closely to the role of the visual in what he names the late-nineteenth-
century medico-scientific invention of “the homosexual.”9 But Seitler
explodes the singularity implied by that “the,” repeatedly pointing to “incon-
sistent renditions within the human sciences of a legible sexual identity evi-
denced on the body” (74, my emphasis). If medical and scientific photography
aspired to codify physical markers of deviance that would allow the taxono-
mizing of sets of discrete “types,” the visual remainders of that attempt attest to
nothing so much as a labyrinthine crossing of sexualities, genders, races, ages,
and dispositions, what Seitler names a “queer physiognomy” (80, 86). The doc-
uments of the turn-of-the-century human sciences reveal efforts to isolate and
categorize, to be sure, but also, together with and constitutive of those prac-
tices, shifting metonymies and unpredictable entanglements.
Seitler characterizes the cultural moment she investigates as “preoccu-
pied with observation, supervision, and the intrigues of a new technology”
(71). The same moment concerns Jonathan Flatley, for whom the new prom-
ise of visibility is less important for what or who is known than for its implica-
tion in a will to knowledge the varied effects of which he approaches via the
figure of Henry James. In “Reading into Henry James,” Flatley begins with loss:
specifically, James’s loss of an audience in the final decade of the nineteenth
century. That individualized loss corresponds to a wider experience of loss
characteristic of modernity as such: the loss of the ability to address only one’s
own problems; the inevitability, in the ever more interimplicated world of late
capitalism, that the difficulties one faces (James’s disappearing audience, for
instance) derive from outside one’s own sphere (in James’s case, from the shift-
ing relations among periodical publication, advertising, and the “literary”).10
Out of such losses, in Flatley’s account, comes The Turn of the Screw, a text in
which “James is not only historicizing his own emotional life but . . . providing
his audience with the materials to do so as well” (109). The reading of James’s
novella that follows takes on the contours of a case study in the affective 
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politics of spectrality,11 for Flatley demonstrates that for James—and perhaps
for everyone else as well—our attachment to the world of society and of things
is possible “only as ghosts (when we are possessed by an emotion from our
past) and with ghosts (the people who are stand-ins for lost objects from our
past)” (120).
A certain spectrality also figures prominently in Steven Shaviro’s essay on
postmodern emotions as the living dead. For Shaviro, Andy Warhol occupies
a position similar to the one James occupies for Flatley insofar as Warhol has
an “exemplary status, even a privileged one, when it comes to looking at the
changes American culture underwent during the second half of the twentieth
century” (125). And Shaviro, too, begins with what looks like a loss: the death
of emotion, a death Warhol himself blamed on TV and the tape recorder. Plac-
ing these “cool” media in connection with what he views as other emotion-
killing developments (such as the movement of camp sensibility into the
mainstream), Shaviro encapsulates the condition of affect under postmoder-
nity in a striking aphorism: “A self without emotions contemplates emotions
without a self” (136). But the situation is not exactly one of loss—or at least
not of an unmitigated one. The ghost of emotion remains: if not passion, then
interest; if not love, then fascination. So the question becomes, for Shaviro as
much as for Warhol, how to embrace this situation, how to celebrate it—or,
since the loss of the capacity for celebration is an aspect of the very situation
at issue, how at least to find it interesting.
Wayne State University
Notes
1. I am grateful to Donna Landry for suggesting that a new sort of materialism cir-
culates in these essays, and to Dana Seitler for pointing out that the term “materia
media” could capture something of that novelty.
2. Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium Is the Massage (New York:
Random House, 1967).
3. In the context of the examples Grusin provides—notably, the second Iraq war, the
“War on Terror,” and Minority Report with its “PreCrime” unit—it perhaps goes
without saying that such deformation cannot be ideologically neutral.
4. See, for instance, the “1st guarantee” of the “Nonmodern Constitution”: “non-
separability of the common production of societies and natures.” Bruno Latour,
We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1993), 141.
5. Donna Haraway characterizes such “‘distributed’ stories” as “metaplasmic,
remodeled versions that give dogs (and other species) the first moves in domesti-
cation and then choreograph an unending dance of distributed and heteroge-
neous agencies.” The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant
Otherness (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003), 28.
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6. Latour, Modern, 144.
7. Compare Bernard Stiegler on “epiphylogenesis,” the development or evolution of
life by means other than life, specifically by tools: “If the individual is organic
organized matter, then its relation to its environment (to matter in general,
organic or inorganic), when it is a question of a who, is mediated by the organized
but inorganic matter of the organon, the tool with its instructive role (its role as
instrument), the what. It is in this sense that the what invents the who just as
much as it is invented by it.” Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans.
Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1998), 185. But this formulation elides what is for Landry a key question: what
gets to count as a who?
8. John Berger, About Looking (1980; New York: Vintage, 1991), 52.
9. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 43.
10. See the formulation Flatley cites from Niklas Luhmann: “autonomy without
autarchy.” The Differentiation of Society, trans. Stephen Holmes and Charles Lar-
more (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
11. “If . . . ‘ontology’—full reconciliation—is not achievable, time is constitutively
‘out of joint,’ and the ghost is the condition of possibility of any present, politics
too becomes constitutive of the social link.” Ernesto Laclau, “‘The Time Is Out of
Joint,’” Diacritics 25 (Summer 1995): 88.
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